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'Even though there has not been an attempt to abol-
ish Bantu customs directly, the attempt was actually
made to replace them surreptitiously with our own law.
I have stated before that there was really a deliberate
attempt - especially through liberalistic influences -
to lead the Native away from what was fine in his
Native rights and customs ... I want to allow him to
develop his own law according to changed circumstances,
but starting from a system of law which is his.' - Dr
Verwoerd, 1955. '
1
 It is perhaps superfluous to say that retention of
customary African legal sytems for Africans is fully
consonant with South African government policy: para-
doxically, perhaps, a desire to move away from these
tribal systems is typicaL of South African liberal
thought.' - PMA Hunt, 1963.
'... Customary law is now my devoted study, not
because I willed it so, nor because I am one with those
who bleat: "Let the natives develop along their own
lines", but because up in the Maluti Mountains, and in
several pocketes of lowland-dwellers, Custom is very
much still the. law and no amount of contempt - for it
by others can alter this fact.' - AMR Ramolefe, 1969.
The study of the terms and mode of application of African cus-
tomary law in South Africa has generally been neglected both by
lawyers and African Studies scholars. In the case of lawyers, there
is little interest in a law potentially relevant to seventy per
cent of the population - where that seventy per cent is for the
most part unable to pay lawyers' fees.
In the case of students of African studies, the segregated legal
and judicial systems may seem of marginal consequence, in the light
of the more serious disabilities that people experience through
more patently repressive laws, such as those regulating influx
control, resettlement, banishment etc., let alone laws concerning
directly political activities. It would nevertheless be wrong, I
shall try to show, to dismiss this area as unimportant or innoc-
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This paper seeks to demonstrate how the special court and legal
system set up to deal with civil cases between Africans, contrib-
utes ideologically, economically and socially, to the national
oppression of the African people.
IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL
While in any class or class-based social formation, coercion may
be used or held in reserve, it is obviously preferable to the
ruling class(es) to govern without the use of force. It is better
to have the oppressed class(es) accept their subjection, to have
them understand that 'it is so1, that it can be no other way, that
there is no alternative to the existing relations of production/
domination. Tnisfi Althusser argues, is achieved (or attempted)
through ideology.
It may be objected that in a colonial-type society (where one
encounters not only class exploitation but also national oppres-
sion, consequent on the denial of self-determination to the major-
ity of the population) there is much more recourse to repression of
the oppressed than ideological domination. This is true. In South
Africa the government of whites is broadly by 'consent', whereas
blacks experience the state in the form of control, regulation and
a variety of other forms of coercion. Yet, even for blacks,
ideology is not dispensed with. There are constant attempts,
through a variety of means, to 'win over' blacks to the institu-
tions of apanjjxejji. Every period of extreme repression coexists
with or is succeeded by renewed attempts to 'win over1 the popula-
tion.
Althusser's work is useful, in explaining the specific way in
which customary law contributes, at the ideological level, towards
the national oppression of Africans. Althusser argues that the
means whereby ideology operates, is through interpellating (consti-
tuting, hailing) concrete individuals as subjects. Through ideol-
ogy* individuals sie.cogjvL4e. th'emselves as subjects. They recognize
the 'obviousness' of their constitution as specific types of
subjects. The 'category of the subject', Althusser argues,.'is the
constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its historical date
- since ideology has no history.
.' I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all
ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that t/ie cat-
ego/iy. of the. ^ ub^ect i^ orviy, conAtJJiwtLvQ. of. CLLL ide.olog.y. JJX -do fxui
cui aJJ. id&oU.og.y, fax* the. filiation (which de.fin.e4 -if.) of. "con^tLtut-
-iag." concsiete, JjuLlviducbLi a* 4u.b4.zctA. In the interaction of this
double consititution exists the functioning of all ideology,
ideology being nothing but its functioning in the material forms of
existence of that functioning.'
In any social formation one is interpellated in a number of
different ways by a number of different Subjects - as citizens,
mothers, daughters, Christians etc. The peculiarity of the South
African social formation lies in the mode of interpellation of
subjects by the state. Unlike convential bourgeois states where
interpellation by the state as subject carries important ideologic-
al consequences, connoting equality and citizenship for all, the
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South African state interpellates individuals not merely as South
African subjects. They are also interpellated - by the state - as
specific types of 'racial subjects' with varying rights - as
'whites', 'Indians', 'Coloureds' and 'Blacks'. In the case of
Africans, furthermore they are not only interpellated as 'Blacks•
but also as specific 'tribal' subjects - as Xhosa, Tswana etc. (In
the case of the Xhosa, this process of sub-division goes even
further with the separate constitution of Ciskeian and Transkeian
Xhosa).
At one moment the African is treated as an ordinary bourgeois
subject. When he or she enters into a contract, the labourer, Mr or
Ms X, is legally equal to Anglo-American. Professors H.R. Hahlo and
Ellison Kahn write that 'equality' is an 'offspring of reasonable-
ness. Since law consists of reasonable rules and not arbitrary ad.
hoc judgements, persqns in the same legal condition can expect to
be dealt with alike.'
In other words, Mr/Ms X, being a contracting party 'in the same
legal condition' as Anglo, cannot expect any account to be taken of
actual differences in negotiating power. 'The power given to one
party by its different class position, the pressure it exercises on
the other - the real economic position of both - all this is no
concern of the law ... That the concrete economic situation compels
the worker to forego even the slightest semblance- of equal rights -
this again is something the law cannot help.' This attitude is
well illustrated in the judgement of Kuper, J. in De Seeyui v
It ofi Mine* (cited liy Hahlo and Kahn);
'Counsel said that justice to all parties required
that Sir Ernest should be called. On two occasions he
told the Court that the fact that Sir Ernest Oppen-
heimer is a very wealthy man should not influence the
court against calling him as a witness. First of all,
i* no evidence, that S-ui Oine^t i* a wealthy, man:
even if he is I think that the suggestion that this
might influence the Court should not have been made
... Ht handly, /teqxtuieA to be /said that the fLinanciaJ-
standing, o/i ^tatuA ofc any payiticuMui pewon La
completely and entisiely ijuielevant when it corner to
the question ofi the /light* of. any citizen in thL*
country.'
Obviously such statements contain a progressive element, for
example, the right of an impoverished black person to damages is,
in theory, as great and meant to be awarded on an equal scale to
that of Sir Ernest. But this approach to class differences - 'There
is no evidence that Sir Ernest is a wealthy man . . . ' - also means
that the notion of surface equality must coexist with an unacknow-
J.edgjed substantial inequality and capacity to coerce.
For purposes of much of criminal law, also, Africans are treated
as South African subjects. A charge of theft, murder, treason,
etc. , does not require a specifically racial or tribal subj ectiv-
ity. Yet here too the non-racial category conceals actual discrim-
ination. In the first place, social conditions in the townships
predispose impoverished blacks to commit offences, especially
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against property.
But the mode of policing and punishing such offenders may also
be discriminatory. Harry Morris KC has remarked: 'A White man is
rarely hanged. The privilege is reserved for the Native. Lashes for
the White man have almost been entirely forgotten, and caning is
only half-remembered ...'
In aspects of the Roman-Dutch civil law and general South Af-
rican criminal law, therefore, a formally non-racial/non-class law
actually discriminates or may discriminate against blacks and
workers or it counceals unequal relations behind a judicial form of
equality.
At another moment, however, the criminal law specifically con-
stitutes Africans as 'Blacks' - OA a QonxLuU-on. fcoi c^Jjninatity.. One
cannot be an accused under certain laws, unless one is a 'Black.'
In the case of pass offences, only a 'Black' has to carry a pass
and is liable to penalisation for failure to have it in his/her
possession.
Though such statutory criminal law interpellates Africans as
'Blacks' and therefore potentially liable for offences that do not
apply to 'non-Blacks', it generally does not specifically differen-
tiate between particular 'tribal' categories. Along with Radio
Bantu, Bantu education, bantustan administrations etc., it -i-d one.
ojL the. fLunatLonA of. the. 4pe.<U.aZ ^y^tem o£ cJ-v-Li taw £OA Apticnn^ to
irutejipoJMite Apitcan^ a* 4pe.CA-fLlc tnJ-baJ. <4ubg.e.ct<j.
Only cases between Africans may be tried by the special courts,
set up under the Black Administration Act. (In the 'independent'
bantustans, however, all people are potentially subject to custom-
ary law in all courts). All parties must be 'Blacks'. Although
the courts have a dLsc/L&tLon to apply 'Black law.', it will be
argued, below, that they tend to favour it over the Roman-Dutch
law.
This 'Black law1 is not a general law (although there is a great
deal of similarity between the various customary tribal laws).
The Black law applied is the law of particular 'tribes'. There are
special rules for resolving disputes where parties belong to
different 'tribes'.
Not only is there a preference for • Black law' but there is a
tendency to apply a rigid, frozen form of original customary law.
The undue preference for 'Black law', in unchanged form, seeks
to halt or set back the process whereby many/most Africans have
reduced or ended their identification with tribal values and alle-
giance to 'tribal authorities'. It further seeks or serves to
undermine the process whereby Africans have tended to reduce inter-
tribal tensions and identify with one another as AfJitca/XA* The pol-
icy of retribalisation through bantustans et aJ. has sought to dis-
organize this growing national movement and to disrupt the
development of national consciousness.
This attempt to halt the process of emancipation from 'tradi-
tional • life and to reestablish the coherence of the ' tribal ord-
er', with Africans having an allegiance to 'their' bantustans, does
not go uncontested. This process is challenged in the first place
by the reality of African life itself, by the fact that Africans do
not generally live as tribespeople anymore. But it is also
challenged at the political level by the growing strength of forces
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working for democracy, which interpellate Africans as Africans and
as South Africans.
ECONOMIC
At the level of the economy, the encouragement of 'traditional'
customary law has consequences for the capacity of families in the
reserves to contribute towards the subsidization of the wage levels
of migrant workers. The encouragement of customary law means the
refurbishing of the patriarchal, joint family system of the tribe.
To the extent that 'Black law1 impedes female emancipation (e.g. it
prevents their emergence as 'free legal subjects', generally
treating women as perpetual minors), it consolidates the family-
centred , male-dominated •tribal• redistributive system. This
subjection and confinement of women as inferior members of a family
group, helps to perpetuate the subsidization of the capitalist mode
of production by production processes in the reserve.
SOCIAL
Characteristically, the African civil court and legal system is
not merely segregated - but it is also inferior in status and in
the quality of the justice dispensed (that is, the degree to which
their judgments satisfy the needs/expectations of litigants in
their specific social situation today). Far from alleviating
disabilities, it will be argued that decisions of these special
courts often add to 'the problems of men and women (but mainly
women) who use them.
In personal relations one expects the law to regulate marriage,
divorce, guardianship etc. in a manner that provides certainty as
well as sufficient flexibility to encompass new living patterns.
The dualistic legal structure does not meet these needs. There
is much uncertainty as to the law, as to who is married or unmar-
ried. The terms of recognition of customary law, as a subsidiary
legal system, has also produced negative side effects, such as the
non-recognition of customary marriage as a lawful union for many
purposes.
THE SPECIAL SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY THE BLACK ADMINISTRATION ACT
I have referred to the "special system of civil law" applied in
cases between Africans. In such litigation courts may apply 'Black
law1 (previously called Native law/Bantu law). "Black law" is not
synonomous with original customary law. It represents those aspects
of African customary law that have been recognised and applied,
subject to various modifications, by South African courts legisla-
tures .
The existence of a separate court and legal system to regulate
civil relations between Africans is a. specifically colonial pheno-
menon. Colonisers invariably declare their own law to be the 'law
of the land1. The law of native peoples has to be specially
'recognised1. In the case of South Africa, the existence of legal
and judicial dualism is merely an aspect of a wider bifurcation of
state functions with separate state structures existing for white
Apu-can. Law
and black in education, politics etc.
THE SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM
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The diagram below contrasts the court system for non-Africans,
that in the 'independent' Bantustans, and the special system estab-
lished for Africans in the rest of South Africa.
|Special Civil Courts |'Independent' Transkei
for Africans |Bophuthatswana, etc.
Courts for
Non-Africans
A.D. Supreme Court
\
Supreme Court
\
Appeal Court Divorce
for Court
Commissioners
Commissioners
t
Chiefs
A.D. of t'Transkei
|Supreme CourV A.D.
[Supreme Court
Magistrates
tChiefs
There is not space here to give a full description of such
questions as the jurisdiction of the various courts. I want to
stress a few factors only:
While Commissioners are at the same 'level' in the judicial
hierarchy as Magistrates, they have a much wider jurisdiction OA to
amount than do magistrates. What this means is that whereas for
cases between non-Africans, litigation involving large sums of
money would have to be tried by Supreme Court Judges, for Africans
such cases would be decided by the equivalent of magistrates, that
is, officers with much lower status and qualifications.
For non-Africans there is practically automatic appeal to the
Supreme Court and then the Appellate Division in civil cases. For
Africans there is an appeal to the special Appeal Court for
Commissioners (appointed from the ranks of Commissioners) and only
very limited possibilities of appeal to the A.D. This means that
for all practical purposes, the development of 'Black law1 is left
in the hands of officials of the Department of Cooperation and
Development.
CRITIQUE OF THE SPECIAL COURTS
There is a widespread feeling amongst academics (echoed to some
that the Commissioners
Speaker after speaker in evidence before
the Hoexter Commissioner into South Africa's court system mounted
criticism against the operation of these courts. Many speakers
extent by practitioners and social workers
Courts are in crisis.
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recognised that Africans regard 'their1 judicial 'dispensation' as
inferior and unsatisfactory. They feared that this would lead to
(or increase?) disrespect for the law.
Part of this expression of anguish is a result of the inability
of these courts to meet the goals set for them. When the special
coruts were established they were presented as providing unique
advantages to Africans. Thus the president of a division of the
Appeal Court remarked in 1929 that he saw in the new courts a
'system of judicature ... embodying a simple and convenient form of
procedure, stripped as far as possible of legal niceties and
technicalities, designed to meet the needs of the situation, one of
the central ideas of which is to bring the machinery within easy
reach of and accessible to, the highest as well as the lowest
members _of the Native community . . . with comparatively little
expense. On a later occasion he elaborated on the legislature's
aims: without losing flexibility, it was intended to bring into
being forums designed to suit the 'psychology' of the African,
recreating as nearly possible the atmosphere of the tribal court to
which Africans were accustomed to submit their disputes.
The Commissioners courts are said to provide 4Ain.pX.Q- pJioco-odirtgA.
If it is true that these courts are a great deal less formal
than the ordinary courts, then it could be argued that African
litigants do no-t need lawyers. They could conduct their own cases
and thus save costs.
In fact it is quite clear that these courts do not perform in a
manner that is remotely comparable to the Chief's courts in the old
society. Their procedures are much more formalistic. Segregated
from the community whose disputes they decide, Commissioners'
courts cannot recapture the flexibility of the tribal court, a
flexibility which arose from the court's position and function in
the community.
To conduct a case successfully one needs a lawyer. Procedure in
these courts is only marginally less complicated than that in the
Magistrate's court. The consequences is that, where one party is
represented and the other not, the represented party is almost
invariably successful.
Whether litigants need a lawyer or not may be an 'open question'
for the academics but it is not for the ordinary people who realise
that they need to be able to pay for their ' justice' One hundred
years ago Ntabeni Magabela, Headman of Peelton Mission Station,
King William's Town, told the Cape Native Laws and Customs
Commission:
1
 Yes. There are many points in which they [i.e. principles of
customary procedure] differ from those of the Colony:-
'First, In the colony a person goes with money to the laywers
in order that his case may be entered upon. He who has no money is
in perplexity about how his case will be heard.'
Cases are regularly dismissed or repeatedly delayed because of
formal deficiencies. Sometimes these defects are the result of the
clerk of the court drawing up summonses incorrectly. On other
occasions, litigants stand bewildered while Commissioners, before
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dismissing pleas, applications or arguments, ask what are confusing
and formalistic questions.
Related to the alleged simplicity of procedure in these courts
is the claim that CCM.£<J QJIQ. ^ub^tantlaXly -Lowes, than in the ordin-
ary courts. Where a litigant appears tultJwut a Mau,ye/i (and with
consequent disabilities) it may be true that his costs will be
relatively low. Yet even this may have to be qualified, for repeat-
ed delays and problems with jurisdiction (especially in the special
divorce court) may mean many days away from work and possible loss
of earnings.
Where a lawyer is employed it is doubtful whether such services
would be any less expensive than for cases involving non-Africans.
The tariff of costs (i.e. court fees etc.) is lower in the special
courts than in the ordinary courts. This does not however stop
attorneys from charging theic usual fees on a 'party to party'
basis for their own services.
These courts may, then, be cheaper than those for non-Africans
if the litigant appears without a lawyer (and, that is, with re-
duced chances of success). Where a lawyer is employed costs are not
substantially lower than for other races.
It is also claimed that these courts are staffed by expesitA.
In the debate preceding the passing of the Black Administration Act
in 1927, the Minister said that he envisaged in these courts 'a man
specially versed in native law.'
In fact the presiding officers hold very low qualifications
(lower civil service law examination) and display the conserva-
tive, sometimes racist attitudes which seem characteristic of the
Cooperation and Development/Bantu Administration department.
Despite these low qualifications Commissioners adjudicate many
matters that, in the case of non-Africans, can only be decided by
Supreme Court judges, whose minimum academic qualification is a
LLB.
Commissioners do not have to be proficient in a Bantu language -
yet it is claimed by some officials that this total reliance on
interpreters has led to 'miscarriages of justice'.
Although not a 'claim' made for these courts, I want to consider
a final characteristic of the special court system, that is, the
type of contribution, made by. pA.acjbltlon.estA and academic* to the
quality of. theAJi £U*i£lce,. Professor Ellison Kahn has remarked
that:
'The process of producing a judgement in a law suit is
a cooperative enterprise. Counsel is there to cite the
relevant authorities and from the cut and thrust of
argument points may emerge that were hitherto latent.
In the word of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, one of the
greatest judges of the United States Supreme Court, a
"judge rarely performs his functions adequately unless
the case before him is adequately presented".1
Quite obviously this principle cannot be realised where the vast
majority of litigants cannot afford to employ legal represent-
atives. Even where litigants do have the funds, attorneys in South
Africa prefer not to handle these cases. Not only do 'Black law •
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cases pay far less well than company law, tax cases etc. , but
"Black law" cases are often very complex and make demands on the
attorney•s time that are considered out of proportion to the finan-
cial rewards.
Even where they are willing, can one say that attorneys and
advocates are compete/it to make a contribution to the law suit if
it is seen (as Kahn says) as a 'co-operative enterprise1?
In the ordinary courts attorneys and advocates often argue
1
 hammer and tongs • not only over the facts but also over the
meaning of the law, the way it is to develop, etc. In Commission-
ers' courts, however, the tendency is to only argue over the facts
and to leave law to the Commissioner, to let him decide what the
law is, whether or not to apply 'Black law' etc. In practice,
therefore, the Commissioner is left free to apply his own static
version of customary law.
The shallowness of the intervention of legal representatives is
largely a Fesult of their training. On the assumption that lawyers
are there to serve the more wealthy 20% of the population, very few
law syllabuses demand a compulsory course in the law governing the
civil relations of the most impoverished 70% of the population.
Where lawyers have studied 'Black law1,• it has generally been
through postivistic textbooks which ignore the changed social
conditions in which customary law operates today. This means that
even where lawyers know something about customary law, their orien-
tation is so narrow that their contribution is likely to reinforce
that of the Commissioners.
IS JUDICIAL INTEGRATION THE SOLUTION?53
Some of the scholars giving evidence to the Hoexter Commission
have called for the scrapping of the separate system of courts for
Africans. In the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswaria and Venda a
formally integrated structure has been established.
It is not inconceivable that the Hoexter Commission will call
for an end to judicial segregation, and it is also not impossible
that the government will agree to the integration of the special
courts as a special 'division* of the Magistrates' courts. The
Riekert Commission has already suggested that 'the administration
of justice function at present exercised by the Department of
Plural Relations and Development can be transferred to the
Department of Justice. Such a step can only be conducive to uni-
formity in the country's administration of justice. Apart from the
transfer of commissioners to the Department of Justice, some
adjustments can be made to the curricula for law examinations in
order to ensure that magistrates are properly prepared to deal with
questions in which Native law arises . . .
Under such a system, especially if the wide jursidiction granted
to Commissioners at present, is retained, the division handling
African civil cases would remain effectively isolated. It would, of
course, be able to continue the ideological function (as it does in
the 'independent' bantustans) of interpellating subjects tribally.
It is true, nevertheless, that if the special Appeal Courts were
abolished and appeals went to the Supreme Court, there would be
greater opportunities for influences from outside the department of
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Cooperation and Development on the development of African civil law
- that is, in the very small number of cases where litigants know
that they are able and can afford to appeal to the Supreme Court.
What effect will judicial integration have, assuming that it
will entail, at least, greater access to the Supreme Court? Judges
have higher academic qualifications than members of the (special
•Black1) Appeal Court, but whether they know much about customary
law (considering that few have ever studied it or handled cases
concerning it) is questionable. Whether they would pursue a more
progressive policy towards customary law is also doubtful. Such
creativity runs counter to basic tenets of £heir training, which is
very antagonistic to 'judicial law-making1.
The fundamental problems that Africans face in civil cases will
remain unresolved, irrespective of whether the hierarchy of appeal
is segregated or integrated. Africans generally cannot afford the
legal representation that they, like whites, need, in order to
litigate effectively. Even those who can afford a lawyer, we have
seen, cannot always obtain one who knows much about customary law.
Certainly there are few practitioners who would be able and willing
to contest the Commissioner's/judge's interpretation of the law and
to urge modifications in accordance with changed social conditions.
An integrated court structure would solve little in itself. To
respond adequately to the-personal law needs of Africans one needs
a primarily African bench - trained to respond more dynamically,
together with adequate provision of legal representation to all who
require it. This cannot be realized in the present state structure.
THE LAW APPLIED
Having provided a brief critique of the courts which decide
African civil law'cases it is necessary to give a fuller picture of
the way in which they have operated in practice and the adequacy
of their decisions, given the-nature of social conditions today.
The Black Administration Act of 1927 gave Commissioners' Courts
a discretion to apply customary law. Section 11(1) reads:
'Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, it
shall be in the discretion of the Commissioners'
Courts in all suits or proceedings between Blacks
involving questions of customs followed by Blacks, to
decide such questions according to the Black law
applying to such customs except in so far as it shall
have been repealed or modified: Provided that such
Black law shall not be opposed to the principles of
public policy or natural justice. Provided further
that it shall not be lawful for any court to declare
that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar
custom is repugnant to such principles.'
This section provides for a dlsSC/i&bLon which operates only in
cases between African and African (In the 'independent' bantustanst
however, the discretion operates in cases involving all races).
Where an African sues a white/ 'Coloured'/Indian or vice versa, the
section has no application and Roman-Dutch law must apply.
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Courts do not have, to apply Black law in case between Africans.
There is a choice ('discretion'). Nevertheless for a number of
years in the 1930s and 1940s the Appeal Court interpreted this
section to mean a mandate for a policy of 'legal segregation' -
that is, that Black law had to be applied as far as possible. In
1948 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, following a
question put by the Minister, reversed these decisions. (Where he
doubts the correctness of any Appeal Court for Commissioners
decision, the Minister may submit it to the AD to decide what the
correct decision should be). They held that section 11(1)
provided no basis for the view that 'native law should be treated
as p/ujna pici.e. applicable in cases between natives . . . '
That is the law (laid down by the highest court) - but there are
nevertheless indications in later decisions that the special courts
are still giving an undue preference to Black law. This
preference is partly a result of their tendency to depict Africans
as an undifferentiated mass, all of whom act and contract, etc.
according to 'tribal' patterns. Thus in one case, when deciding to
apply Black law rather than Roman-Dutch to a case of defamation
arising from an imputation of witchcraft, the court held:
'But amongst Bantu an imputation of witchcraft is a
most serious matter and may result in the most dire
consequences to the person so accused so that any
claim based on such an imputation is essentially a
matter to be dealt with under Bantu law and custom and
in my view, the 'Commissioner was wrong in not having
done so.'
It may well be true that most Africans do believe in witchcraft
and that allegations of witchcraft would .^ause serious social
inconvenience in many African communities. What the court was
required to do in terms of its mandate, however, was to establish
the circumstances of the specific litigants, whether an allegation
of witchcraft would be significant in their particular case. That
it does not do so serves, obviously, to reinforce the constitution
of Africans as tribal subjects - people living in a community to
which the court attributes specifically tribal values.
This discretion arises in cases 'involving, question*} of. custom*
fjoU-Qtvodi by, BJ.ack-41. How one interprets the term 'customs' is
crucial in determining whether customary law is to be frozen in
supposedly 'pure1, 'traditional' forms or whether it is allowed to
retain its dynamic qualities. Thus Julius Lewin remarked in 1947:
'The customs recognised as Native law are ancient
ones. But in actual fact many of these customs or
certain features of them are changing as the social
and economic conditions of Native life change. Nowhere
in the world has social change been as swift and as
far reaching as it has in Africa in the last two or
three decades. Where customs of marriage or family
life have undergone signficant change, which form of
the custom shall the courts recognise as Native law?
Shall they countenance only the practice of the oldest
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generation? Or shall they seek to find current or
contemporary custom in the practice of younger people?
..."
The courts and academics have generally tended to treat the term
'custom' as synonomous with JjrmemonJjcU. U4ag.e.. Thus, in one case,
the court speaks of the rule of succession (male primogeniture) as
'entrenched, sacrosanct'. The court regarded it as a dangerous
doctrine to allow a modern local custom to oust 'a law which had
its genesis in the ancient policy of the founders of the race and
has been universally recognised, and generally applied down through
the ages to the present time'.
This is not to say that there have not in fact been judicial
innovations. The courts and legislature have superimposed on tribal
society common law categories such as majority status, individual
rights to property, etc. In SX^AJM. V Mcuibmba, for example, Mc-
Loughlin, P. introduced the common law term 'majority' and declared
a woman incapable of owning any category of property, all being
vested in the only 'major', the 'kraalhead' or her husband, as the
case may be. Though the decision diminished the rights of women,
this was regarded as a natural result of European judicial
administration of the indigenous law:
'It is when recourse is had to European courts with a
procedure foreign to the Native system that com-
plications and confusion results. The European in-
dividualistic system regards one man as outright
owner, and it is in deference to the principles of
that system that the present-day idea s>f personal
ownership in a kraalhead has taken root.'
The combined impact, of the introduction of individualistic
categories from the common law and the courts' conservative ap-
proach to the formation of custom, has been to strengthen the
patriarchal domination over women. This has meant that the rights
of women are often reducecLRbelow that which they enjoyed in the
precolonial tribal society.
The more general problem, however, is that courts are not deal-
ing with people who are living in the same manner as 'the founders
of the race' . Many men and women are finding that the male/female
relationships of the old society are not always viable or suitable
in the conditions which they experience today. When both men and
women are independent wage-earners, women tend to demand a more
egalitarian marriage relationship, or if unmarried, an independent
female wage-earner, deriving little in the way of protection or few
benefits from her male guardian - will resent his power over her
personal life or her property.
A woman's guardian may be her father, her husband, brother or
even someone much more remote who never makes an appearance except
when it is time to collect Jjobo<Lo pr an inheritance. He has to
consent to her customary marriage (and in Natal and since 1972,
also in the Transvaal, he must consent to her-p^Lvil (Roman-Dutch
law) marriage even if she is oQver twenty one). He is no longer
allowed to force her to marry but he can make it impossible for
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her to marry the man of her choice, through making unreasonable <Lo-
boJ.0 demands.
This 'guardian1, no matter how remote his actual connection with
the woman may be, As entitled to damages for seduction from the
father of her child and he (the guardian) is entitled to loboto
when she marries. If she is an unmarried mother he is entitled to
•LoboJjo for her children, even if he contributes nothing to their
. So
support.
The law regarding divo/ice. from a customary union also reflects
this patriarchal dominance over women. The guardian may come to an
agreement with the husband to dissolve his daughter's/ward's
marriage - even without her consent. A man may simply repudiate
his wife - provided he is prepared to forego the Zobo-lo he has
paid. The woman has no such right. Normally she has to try and
persuade her guardian to return the cattle/ money (or whatever the
<Lobo<Lo comprised). She can, in theory, obtain a divorce if she
has been driven put by her husband, with the intention of ending
the relationship.
The courts, however, are reluctant to conclude that a husband's
behavious constitutes 'repudiation1 and this leads them to condone
violence against the wife. In one case, an application for
dissolution of a customary union was rejected - despite the fact
that the husband had assaulted his wife on a number of occasions,
threatened to stab her, told her to go away and said that he would
kill her if she returned. The court declared that the husband had
not intended to drive
 t her away 'in the legal sense'. In another
case, the court again reinforced the standards of the most
reactionary section of the African community, by depicting it as
'customary':
' It is not uncommon for a Native husband to chastise
his wife. Unless this is done brutally and with a
reckless disregard of the consequences. Natives do not
regard chastisement as a rejection of the wife.'
To summarise: 'custom' has been interpreted by the courts to
mean the custom of the most reactionary sections of the community
and to reject the formation of new, more progressive (and less
narrowly tribal) customs, born of changed living patterns. This
reinforces the patriarchal structure of the traditional family and
in a modest way, adds coherence to the attempts to re-establish
'tribal' order.
Section 11(1) also imposes XJjnLta^Xon^ on the. app-tLcatLon ojt
'QJjxch JMW'. Black law may only be applied where the customs out of
which the law arises are not repugnant to natural justice or public
policy. Although natural justice normally has a fairly precise
meaning, the courts have taken this provision to mean that they
should intervene where particular customs outrage their sense of
morality. In the early days of white administration of customary
law, courts sometimes went so far as to outlaw customary marriage
altogether because of i£s intrinsic connection to the lobo-lo and
polygyny institutions. These were said to reduce women to the
level of slavery while their menfolk enjoyed lives of 'indolent
sensuality'. At one time it was impossible for Africans in the
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Boer republics to contract lawful customary or •common' law
marriages. It was to avoid such excesses in the new climate of
tolerance of African customs (born of virtually completed land
seizure etc.) that the legislature specifically prevented the
courts from declaring -loboZo repugnant.
Since then, the repugnancy clause, where it has been invoked has
often served a relatively progressive function. Through invoking
this provision courts have outlawed ^ variety of coercive
relationships, such as forced marriages. One of the problems has
been that they have been unwilling to use this 'repugnancy clause1
to play a more ambitious reformative role. In consequence,the
Black law that is applied retains many practices that are very
oppressive in relation to women.
Lawyers concerned with the development of customary law in the
Transkei .have attacked the repugnancy clause, using anti-colonial
rhetoric. They argue, correctly, that the clause has often been
used in the past to enforce Europeocentric values. They say,
(also correctly), that the fact that the customary law and not the
common law is subject to the repugnancy clause, reflects the
customary law's inferior status. Digby Koyana, a former member
of the Transkei 'cabinet' writes:
'As the sleeping giant of Africa awakens these
restraints are gradually being removed. Thus, in
Tanzania and Ghana the repugnancy clause has been
dropped. It was' considered unfitting to the dignity of
the indigenous laws of the people of ttx^ se countries
to suggest that repugnancy existed ...'
In principle, there is no reason to object to the view that
Africans (like whites) do not need their customs to be measured
against a repugnancy clause, that their values should be respected
and that repugnancy clauses tend to negate such respect and to
substitute European values for their own.
But this is not an abstract question about Africans or African
values 'in general1 but with what the proposal of Koyana and oth-
ers, to remove the repugnancy clause, would signify in South AfLnXca
today..
Koyana, we have seen, points to post-independence developments
in Ghana and Tanzania in support of his contention that this clause
should be scrapped. If the position in the Transkei or in South
Africa generally were analogous to that in Ghana or in Tanzania
there would be no reason to object, for I think that these states
were correct (as independent states) to get rid of the repugnancy
clause.
But the position in South Africa is (obviously) different.
Getting rid of this clause would (at most) serve to foster the
illusion that such an act were emancipatory. In reality its effect,
in present circumstances, might be undesirable and retrogressive.
Even if (as indicated) the courts have been reluctant to use
this clause for reformist purposes, what effect will it have, to
remove it now? In an area like the Transkei, where the power of
chiefs is entrenched, one possibility is that without a repugnancy
clause there is room for the introduction or reintroduction of a
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variety of customs allowing for coerced relationships and a further
degradation of the status of women. Courts and the repugnancy
clause have an erratic record but they have nevertheless provided a
measure of protection.
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING LAW APPLIED UNDER SEC 11 (1)
We have seen that there appears to be a continued tendency on
the part of the courts, to deny the diversity {and the direction)
of contemporary African social patterns and especially to ignore
the substantially changed lives of many people. This sometimes
leads them to give an unwarranted preference to (their version of)
customary law, instead of Roman-Dutch law. There is also an
unwillingness to recognize that customary law has a diminished
relevance (or no relevance at all) in many peoples' lives.
In responding to such tendencies it is important that one does
not overreact and assume that customary law is a Nationalist Party
creation, and that it has no relevance at all. There is a tendency
amongst liberal academics, under the guise of supporting 'equality
before the law' to adopt a chauvinistic position towards customary
law. Thus, Professor A. S. Mathews is reported to have told a law
conference in 1962 that 'the Roman-Dutch law should be -JP^ de of
general application for all racial groups in South Africa'.
Nor is it acceptable when Professor Carmen Nathan writes:
'The attitude of the South African government is a
reflection of its policy which denies not only the
permanence of the Black people in urban areas but also
the fact that many Black people have lost all tribal
identity. This attitude dhow* a J.ack ofi understanding,
ofi the indigenous -law and the fact that Jjt cnn fjjncJLion
only, in a taaditionaZ netting,. The time f-oi atlotving
the indigenous system to develop and adapt through the
medium ofi ^ udioiaJ. decision ha* -long ^Jjice passed ... '
iu/
While not denying the relevance of customary law this view,
presents a rigid geographical division of the spheres of operation
of Roman-Dutch and customary law. People in the urban areas are
presumed to choose Roman-Dutch law (or if they don't choose it they
dhouJd since, according to Nathan, the customary law cannot
'function' in urban areas). The operation of customary law, accord-
ing to this view, should be restricted to rural areas.
Such an approach underrates or ignores the complexity of living
patterns in both rural and urban areas. Just as rural people are
not unaffected by the changes that are most marked in the towns,
equally there are many urban dwellers who retain a degree of ad-
herence to 'traditional' ideas and behaviour patterns. Ellen Hell-
mann wrote:
'There is no one pattern of urban African family life.
There are many changing patterns of behaviour within
the family, many different adaptations between the
traditional and modern. Income, occupation and educa-
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tion, length of urban residence - quite aoart from
personal attributes affect these patterns.p
What this means is that it is not satisfactory to present people
with the type of either/or choice that Professor Nathan provides:
OAJtheA. one lives with the consequences of a customary union -
unmodified (because 'the time for allowing the indigenous system to
develop and adapt through the medium of judicial decision has long
since passed ...') on. one chooses the Roman-Dutch law marriage.
Now there are a great many Africans who prefer customary mar-
riages to common law ones and they are unlikely to be dissuaded
by talk about the inability of customary marriages to 'function' in
urban areas. And they are right because the basic problem does not
lie in the incapacity of the customary union for reform. (As it
happens, independent. African states have successfully modified and
developed that law).
The problem lies rather in a different kind of incapacity - that
the recipients of Commissioners' Court justice are unable to
influence the course of 'their own1 law. The 'Roman.-Dutdi JMW m.anji-
Lag,e. operates in an environment quite different from that in which
Jjt originated. But it was developed by courts and recently by
parliament in order to cope better with present conditions.
Africans, a colonised people, who are unrepresented in parliament
and hardly represented on the bench cannot rely on a similar sensi-
tivity to their needs. This is not so much a result of the govern-
ment's 'lack of understanding of the indigenous law' - but rather a
result of the wider relations of colonial and class domination, as
a result of which Africans cannot legally influence most of the
fundamental circumstances of their lives.
FUTURE OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR AFRICANS
I have tried to show that the civil justice system established
for Africans by whites in South Africa has generally failed to meet
the actual needs of the overwhelming majority of the population.
But it was not established to meet thejji needs. During the nine-
teenth century when tribal chiefdoms were still vital structures
there was a much less tolerant attitude towards African customs
than one finds in government circles today. It was only after
the seizure of African land and the subjugation of almost all the
chiefdoms that a unified and generally 'benign' policy towards
customary law started to evolve. Having created the condition for
the gradual dissolution of tribal polities, the South African state
sought to breathe new life into discredited chiefdoms through
pseudo-tribal structures such as the Bantu Authorities system.
The Bantu law/court system articulates with this wider policy of
retribalisation and helps to maintain the 'tribal' family. Its
continued viability is important if the patriarchal family
production is to continue its subsidization of the capitalist mode
of production.
Ideologically, the special courts seek to constitute individuals
as specific tribal subjects and this serves or seeks to splinter
attempts at developing a nationaL movement/consciousness. It is
sought to blur the contradiction between Africans and the white
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colonial bloc, through promoting specific tribal identities.
Like much else in the colonial state structure the special court
system is in crisis. It has for some time been patently ill-suited
to the needs of the communities whose lives it is intended to
regulate. Its direction of development is in contradiction to the
emerging social patterns of the Africans community. The current
state of the law of marriage, divorce and the status of women seeks
to perpetuate social categories (e.g. perpetual minority of women)
that are glaringly incompatible with the lives that many. women
actually lead. This legal inadequacy tends to result in many people
taking the view that their de. fjicJio disabilities are less onerous
than that likely to result from recourse to the law courts. Taken
together with the other barriers in the way of successful
litigation, it is not surprising that many people who are separated
do not try to get divorced, many who cannot get their guardian's
consent to marry (often through his making excessive J.obo-io dem-
ands ) form loose unions. All of this contributes to the already
very high levels of illegitimacy and attendant social problems.
One of the most crucial barriers to adequate civil justice for
Africans, that of adequate legal representation, cannot be solved
while the legal profession operates on a basis that puts their
services out of the reach of all save a minute number of Africans.
This problem might be solved in the future by the socialisation of
the legal profession, i.e. provision of legal representation as a
necessary social service to all who need it. .That any substantial
moves in that direction cannot be envisaged under the existing
state structure, is made abundantly clear by a statement of the
Minister of Justice in 1978:
'Legal aid does not exist to be given to every person
who wants it. The idea behind legal aid is that when a
person cannot afford the costs of legal proceedings
and he has a good case - and I want to stress that - a
case which he ought to bring before the court, the
richer sector of society helps the poorer sector of
society to allow the administration of justice to take
place. I do not want a legal aid which is available to
all and .sundry. We are surely not a socialist
society.'
The future of customary law and of the civil justice system
within which it operates are tied to the future of the African
people generally. Though it is possible that limited improvements
may be made in present conditions, adequate resolution of the
problems of African civil law await the satisfaction of the wider
aspirations of the African people in realizing their self-determin-
ation in a democratic system of government.
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